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Abstract: 
We propose the use of stochastic frontier approach to modelling financial constraints 
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of firm characteristics on this measure. We then apply the stochastic frontier approach to a 
panel of Indian manufacturing firms, for the 1997-2006 period. In our application, we 
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stylised intuition found in the literature on financial constraint and the wider literature on the 
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1. Introduction 
 
In the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008-09, a debate about the continuing impact of the 
crisis on the financial constraints of firms continues to rage. The issue of financial constraints 
has long been examined in the literature. It is argued that in a frictionless world, a firm’s 
decision to invest depends on its Tobin’s q (Yoshikawa, 1980), and demand for its output 
(Abel, 1980).
1
 However, as demonstrated by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), capital markets are 
characterised by friction, and the presence of market failure implies that the observed 
investment decisions of firms are also influenced by the extent of their financial constraint. 
 
Following the research of Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988), the stylised literature argues 
that if a firm’s investment is significantly dependent on (and positively correlated with) its 
cash flow, then the firm can be deemed financially constrained. The significance (and 
positive sign) of the coefficient for the cash flow variable is borne out by a number of 
empirical studies (e.g., Bond and Meghir, 1994; Kadapakkam, Kumar and Riddick, 1998).
2
 
                                                          
1
 Hayashi (1982) demonstrates that for a price taking firm in both the product and factor 
markets, with a linear homogeneous technology and linear homogeneous adjustment cost of 
capital, (generally unobservable) marginal q equals (more readily observable) average q. If 
these assumptions are violated, investment depends on output as well. 
2
 It is sometimes argued that a significant coefficient of the cash flow variable does not 
necessarily indicate presence of a financial constraint. If a firm has the ability to maintain 
investment in fixed capital by adjusting working capital, the coefficient of the cash flow 
variable would capture shifts in investment demand. One implication of this line of argument 
is that reduced form models underestimate the impact of financial constraints on investment 
(see Fazzari and Petersen, 1993, for details). Some studies, therefore, use cash holding of 
3 
 
The literature also finds that, in keeping with the banking literature, larger firms that are in a 
better position to reduce the threat of adverse selection by posting collateral are less 
financially constrained than smaller firms (Audretsch and Elston, 2002; Beck and Demirguc-
Kunt, 2006).
3
 Other factors that can ameliorate the problems associated with informational 
asymmetry, such as banking relationships (Shen and Wang, 2005), reduce the sensitivity of 
investment to cash flows. On the other hand, this sensitivity is increased by firm 
characteristics such as high leverage (Aivazian, Ge and Qiu, 2005).
4
 
 
In the stylized literature, the sample of firms is generally classified into groups that have 
differential cost of information, e.g., on the basis of dividend payouts, size and age. The 
differences in the sensitivity of investment to cash flow for these groups are interpreted as the 
manifestation of different degrees of financial constraint. The classification criteria are 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
firms instead of cash flow. However, the use of cash flow in empirical specifications, and the 
use of its estimated coefficients to draw inferences about financial constraint experienced by 
firms are stylised in the literature. 
3
 Audretsch and Elston (2002) demonstrate that, in Germany, on account of the financial 
infrastructure to support small firms, it is the medium sized firms that are most credit 
constrained. But in the United States and the United Kingdom, in keeping with the prediction, 
the smaller firms are more credit constrained. 
4
 The earlier literature focuses almost entirely on financial constraints in developed countries. 
More recently, however, researchers have focused on developing countries and emerging 
markets, specifically on the impact of financial liberalization on financial constraints in these 
countries. See, for example, Guncavdi, Bleaney and McKay (1998), Gelos and Werner 
(2002), and Wang (2003). 
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largely ad hoc, and arguably can lead to erroneous conclusions (Kaplan and Zingales, 1997; 
Laeven, 2003).  
 
In this paper, we propose an alternative approach to empirically modelling financial 
constraints – using stochastic frontiers – which improves over the aforementioned stylized 
approach in three different ways. First, rather than inferring the existence of financial 
constraint from the sign and significance of the cash flow variable, the stochastic frontier 
approach enables us to estimate a measure of financial constraint for each individual firm and 
at each point in time. Since our outcome variable (desired or optimum investment) has a 
natural maximum which is unobserved, the observed value of the outcome variable will not 
exceed its desired (maximum) value. We estimate the unobserved maximum value (desired 
investment) econometrically using actual data on the outcome variable and some covariates, 
and thereby compute the shortfall of investment from its desired value. This shortfall is then 
attributed to financial constraint.
5
 Second, we are able to directly estimate the marginal 
impact of firm characteristics such as size and leverage on financial constraint (and therefore 
on desired investment), without inferring the different degrees of financial constraint on 
different types of firms by splitting the sample into different groups on the basis of some ad 
hoc criteria, and thereafter estimating the different degrees of responsiveness of the 
investment of the average firm in each of these groups to cash flows. Finally, we are able to 
estimate this marginal impact at different levels of the (continuous measures) of firm 
                                                          
5
 Alternatively, this ‘shortfall’ can be viewed as a measure of investment efficiency that is 
bounded between 0 and 1, so that the investment frontier is attained when the efficiency is 1. 
This investment efficiency score tells us the degree of credit constraint for each firm and for 
every year. Importantly, this measure reflects the impact of all the factors (observed as well 
as unobserved) that inhibit attaining the investment frontier, ceteris paribus. 
5 
 
characteristics, thereby developing a better understanding of, for example, whether a firm 
should be of a minimum size or whether it should have a minimum level of cash flow in order 
for it to significantly reduce the extent of financial constraint.  
 
We use the stochastic frontier approach to estimate measures of financial constraints among a 
panel of Indian manufacturing firms, for the 1997-2006 period, and identify firm 
characteristics that explain variations in these measures across firms and over time. Our 
results suggest that, in keeping with the existing literature in firm-level investments, cash 
flows and assets of firms alleviate financial constraints. The degree of financial constraint is 
higher for highly leveraged firms. These results are consistent with the literature that suggests 
that there is significant threat of adverse selection in the Indian credit market, sometimes 
contributing to market failure. We also find that business groups alleviate credit constraints 
for member firms, but their ability to do so has declined over time. Further, this decline was 
not offset by changes in other characteristics of business group affiliated firms; the difference 
in the median investment efficiency of business group affiliated and unaffiliated firms 
increased between 1997 and 2006. 
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: In Section 2, we briefly review the stylized 
empirical approach used to infer presence of financial constraints, and discuss how the 
stochastic frontier approach significantly improves on this stylized approach. In Section 3, we 
discuss the data, and the empirical strategy. The regression results, and the specific insights 
derived from using the stochastic frontier approach, are discussed in Section 4. Finally, 
Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Measuring and explaining financial constraints 
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2.1. The stylized approach 
 
To recapitulate, the literature on investment decisions of firms builds on the work of Fazzari, 
Hubbard and Petersen (1988), who use Value Line data for 422 large U.S. manufacturing 
firms over the 1970-84 period. If a value maximizing firm is not financially constrained, its 
investment decisions depend only on its future prospect, which is captured by Tobin’s q,6 and 
perhaps also by its current and past sales. However, if the firm is finance constrained, its 
investment is also affected by cash flow that is a proxy for internal resources. In the tradition 
of the literature we characterise the regression model as follows:  
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where I is investment, X is vector of variables that captures investment opportunities, CF is 
cash flow, K is capital, and ε is the independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) noise 
term. In light of our earlier discussion, it is obvious that the components of vector X are 
Tobin’s q and present and lagged values of sales. In the literature, variants of this model have 
been estimated using both pooled (ordinary least squares) regression (Lang, Ofek and Stulz, 
1996) and fixed effects panel regression models (Aivazian, Ge and Qiu, 2005). 
 
Equation [1] is generally extended, as required, to examine the impact of factors over and 
above cash flow that can capture frictions in the capital market on investment levels. 
Furthermore, where panel data are used, firm and time-effects are added to control for 
possible firm- and time-heterogeneity in the intercept. For example, Aivazian, Ge and Qiu 
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 For a discussion of the optimisation problem of a value-maximising firm that underpins this 
specification, see Hubbard (1998).  
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(2005) examine the impact of leverage on firm investment in Canada using the following 
regression model: 
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where θ and μ capture time and firm fixed effects, and ε is the i.i.d error term. As in the case 
of [1], if the cash flow and leverage coefficients in above regressions are found to be 
statistically significant, one might argue that firms are finance constrained. 
 
In much of the literature, the sample of firms is classified into groups that have differential 
cost of information, and hence different likelihoods of being financially constrained, on the 
basis of some criterion. The differences in sensitivity of investment to internal resources (i.e., 
cash flows) for these groups capture the differences in the extent of credit constraint. The 
Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) paper classify firms on the basis of their dividend 
payouts, while other studies use firm characteristics such as size and age. While the basis for 
the chosen criteria are plausible, it is nevertheless ad hoc, especially when the criteria are 
potentially time varying. Kaplan and Zingales (1997) show that the cash flow sensitivity to 
investment could lead to erroneous conclusion when firms are classified into groups of high 
or low costs of information by dividend pay-out or any other criterion. As discussed in 
Laeven (2003), a priori classification of firms into groups using other criteria might lead to 
erroneous conclusion as well. 
 
2.2. The stochastic frontier approach 
 
The stochastic frontier approach is an econometric technique that is primarily constructed to 
estimate the underlying production technology along with technical inefficiency for 
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individual producers (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). The unique feature of the stochastic 
frontier model is that the error term is the sum of a one-sided (i.e., non-negative) technical 
inefficiency term and a two-sided noise term. In principle, the stochastic frontier tool can be 
used in a variety of cases where the one-sided technical efficiency can be viewed as deviation 
of the outcome variable from its (desirable) maximum/minimum value (which is 
unobserved). For example, observed wage is likely to be less than the maximum the 
employers were willing to pay (which is unobserved). Similarly, the (observed) selling price 
of a house is likely to be more than the (unobserved) minimum that the seller was willing to 
accept. In our case, the observed amount of investment by a firm is always less than (or equal 
to) the unobserved desired level of investment, on account of factors that increase firm-
specific risk or informational cost. Hence, just as in the example about wages the one-sided 
technical efficiency term reflects the informational constraint that prevents the employees 
from extracting the full wage that the employer was, in principle, willing to pay, so also in 
our context the one-sided technical efficiency term can be labelled as the effect of financial 
constraint on investment. This enables us to model financial constraints of firms on 
investment using the stochastic frontier approach which, as we discuss below more formally, 
provides a better way of testing the presence of constraints in the investment function and 
examining the impact of the constraining variables on investment.  
 
As discussed above, in the stylised literature that builds on the pioneering work of Fazzari, 
Hubbard and Petersen (1988), a firm’s investment decisions depend only on its future 
prospect, which is captured by Tobin’s q, and perhaps also by its current and past sales (the 
components of vector X in equation 1). If other firm characteristics such as cash flow have an 
impact on these investment decisions, the firm is believed to be financially constrained. In 
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other words, in the absence of capital market imperfections and financial constraints, Tobin’s 
q and current and past sales are sufficient to characterise the investment decisions of the firm. 
 
In keeping with this, Wang (2003) argues that in the absence of agency conflicts and capital 
market imperfections a firm’s investment decision can be defined as follows: 
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where θ, μ and ε have the same interpretation as above. This regression model, therefore, 
defines the efficient investment function (frontier). In the presence of financing constraints, 
the observed investment-to-capital ratio is less than the efficient (optimal) investment-to-
capital ratio in [3]. Thus, the difference between this efficient investment-to-capital ratio and 
the observed investment-to-capital ratio is attributed to financing constraint. This difference 
can be represented by a non-negative term u. More specifically, we write the observed 
investment-to-capital ratio as:  
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Models [3] and [4] together define the stochastic frontier formulation of the investment 
function, and can be estimated using the distributional assumptions on u and ε that were 
discussed earlier. It is evident that the stochastic frontier approach gives us not only the 
estimates of the parameters of the investment function but observation-specific estimates of 
the one-sided investment efficiency term u as well, and therein lies the key to the application 
of stochastic frontier approach to the literature on firm-level financial constraints. Note that 
the first part of [4] shows that       
              , given         Therefore,       
    can be 
viewed as investment efficiency which is bounded between 0 and 1. Thus, for example, an 
efficiency score of 0.8 indicates that the firm’s investment is at 80 percent of its desired level. 
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Alternatively, u times 100 can be viewed as the percentage shortfall of investment from its 
desired (frontier) level due to the presence of financial constraints. Thus, u can be labelled as 
investment inefficiency (which parallels the definition of technical inefficiency in production 
function models). It measures shortfall of investment from its desired level (just like technical 
inefficiency which measures output shortfall, in percentage terms) manifesting the presence 
of financial constraints. 
 
The first (and perhaps the main) advantage of the stochastic frontier approach, therefore, is 
that the estimated (non-negative) values of u can tell us not only whether a firm is financially 
constrained, but also the degree (or severity) of this constraint. The higher the value of u 
greater is the impact of constraints on investment. Thus, in the present case, the frontier 
represents the desired investment function which is unobserved and the u term represents a 
firm’s inability to attain the investment frontier, ceteris paribus, due to the presence of 
financing constraints. Aside from the ease of interpretation, the investment efficiency score 
has the advantage that it captures the combined impact of all the constraining variables on the 
extent of credit constraint. By contrast, alternative methodologies such as OLS or fixed 
effects panel regression models captures only the marginal impact of individual firm 
characteristics (Z) on investment of the average firm, and hence do not tell us whether or not 
an individual firm is credit constrained overall, and if so by how much.
7
 With the stochastic 
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 The intuition for this observation is clear: high leverage, for example, may increase the 
extent of a firm’s financial constraint on its own, but the firm might be able to offset this 
disadvantage by having its loans de facto underwritten by a wider business group, thereby 
reducing the overall degree of its credit constraint. The technical explanation is as follows: In 
models such as [1] and [2] the difference between the expected values of  ln(   /        with 
and without the Z variables might not be negative. A negative value for  , 1 Z 0(ln( / ) | ) it i tE I K     
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frontier approach, therefore, it is possible to examine distributions of the extent of financial 
constraints of the firms from the efficiency scores, and compare distributions of financial 
constraints across firm types and over time. Importantly, adoption of the stochastic frontier 
approach eliminates the requirement to use any ad hoc criteria to split the sample, to 
understand the different degrees of financial constraint of different types of firms. 
 
Another advantage of the stochastic frontier approach is that we can directly estimate the 
impact of firm characteristics (Z) such as size and leverage on the degree of financial 
constraint, rather than estimate the impact of these characteristics on investment of the 
average firm and infer from these estimates whether or not they contribute to financial 
constraint (for example, in [2]). This can be done by extending the basic model proposed 
above to accommodate the Z variables. As discussed earlier, in the stylized literature, firm 
characteristics that impact financial constraint of firms include the logarithm of physical 
assets (LOGASSET), cash flows (CF), and financial fragility that is usually measured using 
the debt-to-equity ratio (LEVERAGE). In certain contexts, financial constraint is also affected 
by membership of business groups (GROUP),
8
 and the impact of business group membership 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
, 1 Z 0(ln( / ) | )it i tE I K   can be interpreted as percentage reduction in investment due to the presence 
of credit constraints (proxied by the Z variables), where E(.) is the expectation operator. In 
other words, although one can show that firms are credit constrained from the marginal 
effects of the Z variables, it is not possible to quantify the degree of it. 
8
 We have already discussed the ways in which cash flow, firm size or assets, and leverage 
affect financial constraints. The literature also suggests that the impact of capital market 
failure on investment can be reduced by organisational structures such as business groups. 
This could be, as in the case of Japan, on account of access to banks that are an integral part 
of these groups (Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein, 1991). Alternatively, this could be on 
12 
 
on financial constraint can be time varying. We accommodate these Z variables into the 
model via the inefficiency term, i.e., we now assume that           
              where 
                    and       is specified as 
' itZ    
    
      
                                    
 
                              [5] 
where the exponential specification is used to ensure non-negativity of         9 and    is the 
parameter vector associated with these Z variables. Since, in this specification,        
                          , we can easily find the marginal effect of individual Z 
variables on investment inefficiency. If a Z variable lowers u (i.e., relaxes the financing 
constraint), the marginal effect will tell us by what percent investment will increase if a Z 
variable is increased by one percent.  
 
Indeed, it can be argued that (variations of) the specification used in the OLS and fixed 
effects panel approaches are a special case of the stochastic frontier model. Consider, for 
example, the following variation of [1] which includes the Z variables enumerated in [5]: 
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account of internal capital markets that are generally associated with business groups such as 
the Korean chaebols (Shin and Park, 1999). 
9 TIMETREND is a variable that has the value one for the first year of the sample period and 
increases by one for each subsequent year in the sample period. The interaction term 
involving the group membership dummy and the time trend variable captures the changing 
impact of business group membership on a firm’s financial constraint over time. 
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Next, consider the stochastic formulation of the baseline equation: 
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If we denote            , it is clear that     will have a non-zero mean because     is non-
negative, and this poses a problem in using OLS (which will assume zero mean error). This 
non-zero mean problem can be avoided by rewriting     as                      
          
         where      
     by construction. We then get an error term that has a 
zero mean but need to account for the extra term –       in the regression. If we assume that  
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then we get back [6]. Thus, we can justify the use of [6] starting from a frontier model. The 
advantage of using [7] is that the distributional assumptions about u and v in the stochastic 
frontier model guarantees that –         , thereby shedding light on the extent of financial 
constraint of a firm in each of the years of analysis. As discussed earlier in this section, the 
traditional approaches based on OLS and fixed effects panel models do not offer this 
advantage. 
 
Finally, the stochastic frontier approach allows us to estimate the marginal impact of each 
(continuous) Z variable on the degree of financial constraint, at different points of the 
distribution. This can provide important insights. For example, if we find that the impact of 
size (i.e., LOGASSETS) on the degree of financial constraints is large for firms that are below 
the 50
th
 percentiles of the size distribution, but small or not economically meaningful 
thereafter, we would be able to infer that while size can ameliorate financial constraints, it 
does not play an important role in reducing financial constraint beyond a point, and hence 
14 
 
larger firms should look at alternative factors such as leverage to reduce financial constraints. 
Since the stylized methodology based on the use of OLS and panel regression models do not 
permit us to estimate the impact of firm characteristics on the degree of financial constraints 
itself, they cannot, of course, provide such insight.
10
 
 
3. Applying the stochastic frontier approach: data and empirical strategy 
 
We apply the stochastic frontier model described in [3] – [5] above to firm-level data from 
the Indian manufacturing sector, for the 1997-2006 period.
11
 India, which has a bank-based 
financial system, has witnessed progressive liberalisation of its real sector since 1985 and its 
financial sector since 1992. By the second half of the 1990s, the banks enjoyed a fair degree 
of autonomy (Bhaumik and Piesse, 2008), and the equity market was growing rapidly. 
Correspondingly, the post-1991 period witnessed significant growth in both credit and private 
sector investment.
12
 The net outstanding credit to the industrial sector rose from INR 578.6 
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 Indeed, estimating [1] or [2] for each quintile of the size distribution would indicate, 
through the cash flow variable, whether or not larger firms are less financially constrained 
than the smaller firms. But we would not have a sense of the extent to which (say) a $1 
million increase in assets reduces financial constraint. 
11
 We do not include data for 2007-09 in our sample to exclude the period of global financial 
crisis from our sample. While India was not significantly affected by the crisis, there was, 
nevertheless, a noticeable drop in the country’s GDP growth rate, implying a possible change 
in its business environment. 
12
 Resources mobilised through capital market continue to account for less than 3 percent of 
GDP. By contrast, domestic credit provided by the banking sector rose from 44.1 percent of 
15 
 
billion in 1993-94 to INR 3408.9 billion in 2008-09, in real terms, recording an annual 
average growth rate of 11 percent. However, because of the implementation of stricter 
prudential norms banks have held government securities over and above the prescribed 
minimum requirement. This has resulted in lower credit growth than what would have been 
consistent with the high rate of growth in the real sector (Marjit and Das, 2008). The average 
annual growth rate of private investment for (roughly) the corresponding period was 17.77 
percent. Yet, even during the second half of the last decade, there was prima facie evidence 
of financial constraints inhibiting investment growth at the firm level (Chaudhuri, Koudal and 
Sheshadri, 2009). The country therefore provides an excellent setting for an empirical 
examination of the factors that affect firm-level investment in the presence of capital/credit 
market imperfections and agency conflicts. 
 
Our sample includes a set of 598 Indian private manufacturing firms incorporated prior to 
1991. We focus on private firms which, unlike many state-owned firms, do not have soft 
budget constraints on account of access to the public purse, and, even though some of the 
firms have foreign equity participation, they do not have access to the global capital market. 
Our sample of firms are largely dependent on the local credit market to finance their 
investments which is quite representative for not just Indian firms but privately owned firms 
in nearly all emerging markets. The choice of firms that were incorporated before 1991 
ensures that all the firms in the same had time to develop banking relationships well before 
the sample period of 1997-2006. Our results should therefore not be influenced by a sub-
sample of new firms that are credit constrained on account of weak banking relationships. 
Finally, the choice of manufacturing firms alone is consistent with a wide range of empirical 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
GDP in 1995 to 64.2 percent of GDP in 2007. By all accounts, India remains a bank based 
economy. 
16 
 
analyses that do not pool together manufacturing and services sector firms that are different 
in many ways.  
 
Data on these firms are obtained from the widely used Prowess database marketed by the 
Centre for Monitoring the Indian Economy (CMIE). Prowess provides balance sheets and 
profit and loss accounts of firms in a standardised format, making the numbers comparable 
across the firms. Data on variables such as sales, capital, investments and cash flows can 
therefore be directly obtained from the database or easily computed. Prowess also provides 
information on financial ratios such as the debt-to-equity ratio that is our measure of leverage 
or financial fragility, as well as information on business group affiliations Our definition of 
variables is consistent with the existing literature. 
 
[insert Table 1 about here] 
 
In Table 1, we report the summary statistics of the variables we use in our regression models. 
The figures are self-explanatory, and only one variable needs further explanation. We 
discovered through experimentation that the debt-to-equity ratio of firms, our measure of 
leverage, does not have an impact on investment decisions or the aforesaid inefficiency when 
it is used in the relevant regression specification in linear and quadratic forms. This is not 
surprising; a change in the leverage from (say) 0.2 to 0.3 may not have any impact on a firm’s 
ability to borrow, but an increase from 1.6 to 1.7 might have a significant impact.
13
 Indeed 
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 This argument is not unique to this particular context. For example, while an increase in an 
investor’s ownership from 10 percent of a company to 11 percent may not have any impact 
on the behaviour or performance of the company, an increase from 49 percent to 50 percent, 
which gives the investor outright control of the company, may have a significant impact. 
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evidence suggests that leverage has a threshold effect on credit ratings. Hence, as a proxy for 
leverage, we used a dummy variable that takes the value one when the leverage is high, and 
zero otherwise. Experimentation with the threshold suggests that leverage adds to financial 
constraint for threshold values of debt-to-equity ratio beyond 1.6. When the threshold of 1.6 
is used, the coefficient of the high-leverage dummy variable is significant at the 10 percent 
level. The statistical significance of the coefficient improves as the threshold is raised. We 
use the cut-off value of 1.8 for our estimation. In our sample, sixteen percent of the firms 
reported high leverage. 
 
Our empirical strategy is in two parts. To begin with, we demonstrate that the interpretations 
of the Z variables in the stochastic frontier model are consistent with those of the coefficients 
of these variables in OLS and panel regression models. Our expectations are summarised in 
the following table: 
 
Pooled OLS 
Panel 
fixed effects 
Stochastic  
frontier 
Cash flows + + - 
(Log) assets + + - 
Leverage - - + 
Business group 
membership 
+ + -  
Business group 
membership × Time trend   
? ? ? 
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For example, we know from the stylized literature that existence of financial constraints is 
manifested by a positive (and significant) coefficient of the cash flow variable. In the 
stochastic frontier model, however, the cash flow variable does not explain investment itself, 
rather investment inefficiency or the degree of financial constraints. Hence, if cash flows 
alleviate financial constraints, i.e., reduce investment inefficiency, then in the stochastic 
frontier model the cash flow variable will have a negative coefficient. The rest of the table 
can be similarly explained. After confirming that the coefficient estimates of the Z variables 
are meaningful, we demonstrate and discuss the aforementioned advantages of the stochastic 
frontier approach. 
 
4. Regression results and discussion 
 
The regression results are reported in Tables 2 and 3. In Table 2, we report the OLS estimates 
and estimates of the panel fixed effects model. For each of these models, we progressively 
introduce the factors that determine investment in contexts without agency conflicts and 
market imperfections (Columns 1 and 4), the much discussed cash flow and (log) asset 
variables that capture a firm’s ability to mitigate credit constraints (Columns 2 and 5), and the 
less discussed leverage and business group membership variables that also affect a firm’s 
investment decisions (Columns 3 and 6). The F-statistics and the R-squared values for the 
models are reported as well, and they indicate that the specifications are meaningful, and are 
a reasonably good fit for the data. 
 
[insert Table 2 about here] 
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In Table 3, we report the estimates of stochastic frontier models with fixed effects. The model 
in column (1) assumes that investment inefficiency u is i.i.d., 2(0, ), 0u itN u   but does not 
attempt to explain this inefficiency. The models in columns (2) and (3) capture the impact of 
firm characteristics on inefficiency. As in the case of the OLS and fixed effects panel models, 
we introduce the firm characteristics gradually. We include the cash flow and (log) assets 
variables in column (2), and add the leverage and business group membership variables in 
column (3).  
 
[insert Table 3 about here] 
 
The regression results suggest that, as expected, Tobin’s q and investment decisions are 
generally positively correlated. Current sales too always has a positive impact on investment, 
while sales lagged one period has a positive coefficient for the panel fixed effect model and 
most of the specifications of the stochastic model, but negative coefficients for the OLS 
models. As we have already noted, when sales accelerator is modelled as a function of 
current and past sales, some of the coefficients may be negative (Abel and Blanchard, 1989). 
Overall, wherever the sales lagged one period has a negative coefficient, the coefficient of the 
current sales variable is much larger, and it is reasonable to conclude that sales have a 
positive impact on investment decisions. 
 
We now turn to the factors that alleviate or aggravate the friction in the capital and credit 
markets. The coefficients of these variables, reported in Tables 2 and 3, can be summarised as 
follows: 
 
Pooled OLS 
Panel  
fixed effects 
Stochastic frontier 
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Cash flows  + - 
(Log) assets + + - 
Leverage - - + 
Business group 
membership 
+  - 
Business group 
membership × Time trend   
- - + 
 
 
In other words, the coefficient estimates of the Z variables in the stochastic frontier model, 
which are remarkably robust across estimation methodologies and specifications, are 
consistent with their interpretation in the stylized literature, and hence meaningful.
14
 Overall, 
the regression estimates suggest the following: 
                                                          
14
 We undertake four robustness checks for our estimations. First, we recognize the fact that 
in India long term debt often accounts for a greater proportion of assets than equity. This is 
especially true for older firms, a lot of whose assets were acquired prior to the growth of the 
Indian equity market. Following Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988), we replace the usual 
measure of Tobin’s q with one that takes into account long term debt, i.e., our new measure 
of Tobin’s q is the ratio of the sum of the value of equity and long term debt to the 
replacement cost of these assets. Second, we take into account the possibility that, aside from 
Tobin’s q and expected sales, investment decisions can be affected by uncertainty. We use as 
our proxy for a firm’s uncertainty during a given year the variance of stock returns of that 
firm during that year (Leahy and Whited, 1996). Third, following the suggestion of an 
anonymous referee, we replaced the dummy variable for high leverage with a more general 
functional form with respect to leverage, namely, 1L + 2(L – L*)D, where L is leverage, L* 
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 Investment is positively correlated with cash flow; conversely, cash flow reduces 
financial constraints. This is consistent with the mainstream literature on firm level 
investments. 
 Similarly, investment (financial constraint) is positively (negatively) correlated with 
(log) assets, our proxy for access to collateral. This has significant implications for 
fast growing firms and service sector firms whose collaterizable assets may be small 
relative to their investment needs. 
 The extent of friction or financial constraint is higher for highly leveraged firms, 
signalling perhaps both prudence and risk aversion of the creditors and investors. This 
is consistent with the available evidence about the risk aversion of Indian banks 
(Bhaumik and Piesse, 2008). 
 The pooled OLS and stochastic frontier estimates suggest that business group 
membership alleviates credit constraints, which is consistent with the stylised view 
about internal capital markets associated with these organisational structures. But the 
negative coefficient of the interaction term involving the time trend indicates that the 
advantages of belonging to a business group declines over time and disappears by the 
ninth or tenth year of the sample period, by the end of the first decade of this century. 
The panel fixed effects results suggest that business group membership aggravated 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
is the threshold for high leverage (such as 1.8), and D is a dummy variable that takes the 
value 1 when L > L*. We experiment with more than one value for L*. Finally, we replace 
the debt-to-equity ratio by another measure of financial distress, namely, the solvency ratio. 
The choice of solvency ratio as a proxy for financial fragility is consistent with the research 
of Gryglewicz (2011). However, none of these changes affects our results. We, therefore, do 
not report the coefficient estimates associated with these new specifications. 
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credit constraints throughout the sample period. This is consistent with the argument 
that while business groups are an optimal response to market failures in various 
contexts, the disadvantages associated with their opaque structures and questionable 
corporate governance qualities, as well as resistance to change, might outweigh the 
advantages once economic reforms liberalise factor and product markets and reduce 
the difficulty in accessing resources. This result is also consistent with that of 
Borensztein and Lee (2000), who found that subsequent to the financial crisis in South 
Korea in 1997, the chaebol affiliated firms lost their advantage with respect to access 
to credit. 
 
[insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
Next, we generate firm- and year-specific measures of technical (investment) efficiency from 
our stochastic frontier models. To recapitulate, the investment efficiency measure is bounded 
in (0, 1), with values close to zero indicating a high degree of credit constraint and values 
close to one indicating very little credit constraint. In order to understand how financial 
liberalisation and associated corporate restructuring have affected credit constraints of Indian 
firms, in Figure 1 we report the distributions of firm-specific investment efficiency for 1997 
and 2006. Figure 1(a) suggests that while larger firms (in the top quartile of size distribution) 
were less credit constrained than the smaller firms (in the bottom quartile of the size 
distribution) in 1997 – distribution of investment efficiency of larger firms shifted to the right 
of the corresponding distribution for smaller firms – by 2006 the difference between the two 
types of firms had largely disappeared.
15
 Similarly, Figure 1(c) suggests that while highly 
                                                          
15
 It is easy to see that we could have taken into account the entire distribution of the degree 
of credit constraint (reflected by the measure of investment efficiency), without splitting the 
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indebted firms (those with debt-to-equity ratio higher than 1.8) were more credit constrained 
than firms with lower level of indebtedness (debt-to-equity ratio less than 1.8) in 1997, any 
remaining difference is not discernible from the distributions for 2006. However, it is 
difficult to detect patterns from Figure 1(b) which graphs the investment efficiency of 
business group members and non-members. 
 
[insert Table 4 about here] 
 
In Table 4, we report the means and medians of the distributions plotted in Figures 1-3. It is 
easily seen that the contrast between investment efficiency of larger and smaller firms, and 
firms with and without a high level of indebtedness was sharper in 1997 than in 2006. By 
2006, characteristics such as size and leverage were no longer sufficient to characterise the 
extent of credit constraints experienced by the firms; the differences in means and medians of 
the size and leverage classes was negligible. As such, this would suggest that credit market 
imperfections were reduced by 2006; firms did not require credible signals in the form of 
assets and low leverage to access credit. At the same time, however, the mean and median 
investment efficiency of all types of firms were reduced between 1997 and 2006. A plausible 
explanation for this is that firm-level demand for credit was rising faster than access to credit, 
as the fast growing economy opened up ever more opportunities for the firms. This 
explanation is consistent with the findings of Banerjee et al. (2005), namely, that banks in 
India determine credit in period t based on credit sanctioned in period t-1, without taking into 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
sample in any way, and constructed a matrix with size deciles along one axis and investment 
efficiency deciles along the other. The off-diagonal elements of this matrix would have told 
us whether the degree of financial constraint is biased in favour of large or small firms. 
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consideration the growth potential of the firms. It is also consistent with the findings of Marjit 
and Das (2008).  
 
The summary measures of investment efficiency reported in Table 4 also have implications 
for corporate restructuring. Business group non-members had higher median (and mean) 
investment efficiency than their business group member counterparts in 1997, and by 2006 
the difference in the median investment efficiency of business group members and non-
members had widened further. To recapitulate, the marginal impact of business group 
membership on investment efficiency (inefficiency) was positive (negative) at the start of the 
sample period, but this marginal impact had turned negative (positive) by 2006. The 
mean/median investment efficiency figures reported here suggest that even as business group 
membership itself aggravated financial constraints for member firms between 1997 and 2006, 
other characteristics of business group affiliated firms did not change in a way that could 
offset this disadvantage. In other words, while business groups persist in the Indian corporate 
landscape, as in countries like South Korea (Boresnztein and Lee, 2000), the rationale for 
forming business groups and sustaining corporate structures that incorporate them has 
weakened since the initiation of financial and other reforms in the early nineties. This 
consistency with the literature is a reaffirmation of the meaningfulness of our measure of 
degree of financial constraint. 
 
[insert Table 5 about here] 
 
Finally, we estimate the marginal impact of the continuous variables, namely, cash flow and 
(log) assets, on the degree of financial constraint, for the 10
th
, 25
th
, 50
th
, 75
th
 and 90
th
 
percentiles of their respective distributions. The marginal effects suggest that while cash flow 
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and (log) assets reduce investment inefficiency, i.e., alleviate financial constraints for firms at 
all points of their distributions, the marginal impact of both these variables is much higher for 
firms that are at the lower tails of these distributions. For example, cash flow has a marginal 
effect of -0.0016 for firms at the 90
th
 percentile of the distribution, but this marginal effect 
doubles to -0.0032 for firms that are at the 10
th
 percentile of the distribution. Similarly, the 
marginal effects of (log) assets for the corresponding percentile levels of its distribution are -
0.1062 and -0.2104, respectively. 
 
In sum, the estimates of our stochastic frontier model are both consistent with the stylized 
literature that uses OLS and panel regression models, and have meaningful interpretations. 
We also successfully demonstrate the three advantages of the stochastic frontier approach 
over the stylized methodology, all of which stem from our ability to estimate the degree of 
financial constraint of each firm and for each time period. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
In this paper, we argue that the stochastic frontier approach has significant advantages over 
the empirical methodology that is used in the stylized literature on financial constraint of 
firms. The former provides much better insights about the degree of financial constraints of 
firms and its change over time, and also about the impact of individual firm characteristics on 
this degree. We demonstrate these advantages by applying the stochastic frontier approach to 
a firm level data set from India, for the 1997-2006 period. 
 
Our results suggest that firms in India experience significant credit constraint despite 
significant banking expansion since 1969 and despite nearly two decades of financial 
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liberalization. There is a decline in median investment efficiency of the firms over the sample 
period, when investment efficiency refers to the ability a firm to translate characteristics such 
as its Tobin’s q ratio and sales-to-capital ratio into actual investment. In keeping with the 
existing literature in firm-level investments, financial constraints in India are alleviated by 
cash flows and (log) assets of firms, and aggravated by a high leverage level. We also find 
that business groups alleviate credit constraints for member firms, but their ability to do so 
has declined over time.  
 
The stochastic frontier approach provides us with a powerful tool to explore the issue of 
financial constraint that has gained in importance since the financial crisis of 2008-09. Wider 
adoption of this tool would therefore be an important step in the direction of improved 
analyses of these constraints. 
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Table 1. Summary statistics 
 
   Mean 
  Standard 
  Deviation 
   
(Log) Tobin's q - 1.06   1.43 
   
(Log) Sales(t)/Capital(t-1)   0.31   0.90 
   
(Log) Sales(t-1)/Capital(t-2)   0.36   0.82 
   
Cash flow(t)/Capital(t-1)   2.25   2.21 
   
(Log) Assets   4.14   1.58 
   
Proportion of firms with high debt-to-equity ratio   0.16   0.36 
   
Proportion of firms with business group membership   0.31   0.46 
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Table 2. Stylized regression models 
 
 Ordinary least squares Panel fixed effects 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
       
(Log) Tobin's q   0.11 ***   0.11 ***   0.04 **   0.13 ***   0.17 ***   0.12 *** 
   (0.02)   (0.02)   (0.02)   (0.02)   (0.02)   (0.02) 
(Log) Sales(t)/Capital(t-1)   0.71 ***   0.67 ***   0.67 ***   0.95 ***   0.46 ***   0.44 *** 
   (0.05)   (0.04)   (0.03)   (0.03)   (0.05)   (0.05) 
(Log) Sales(t-1)/Capital(t-2) - 0.20 *** - 0.11 * - 0.17 ***   0.35 ***   0.54 ***   0.55 *** 
   (0.06)   (0.06)   (0.04)   (0.05)   (0.05)   (0.05) 
Cash flow(t)/Capital(t-1)    0.005   0.01   . 0.10 *** - 0.11 *** 
    (0.02)   (0.02)    (0.02)   (0.02) 
(Log) Assets    0.18 ***   0.17 ***    0.69 ***   0.74 *** 
    (0.02)   (0.01)    (0.04)   (0.04) 
High debt-to-equity ratio   - 0.30 ***   - 0.29 *** 
     (0.07)     (0.06) 
Business group membership     0.76 ***     0.23 
     (0.14)     (0.82) 
Time trend × Business group 
membership   - 0.07 ***   - 0.07 *** 
     (0.01)     (0.01) 
Constant - 3.08 *** - 3.88 *** - 3.82 *** - 3.28 *** - 6.25 *** - 6.32 *** 
   (0.04)   (0.09)   (0.09)   (0.03)   (0.19)   (0.32) 
             
           
F-statistic   139.42 ***   114.26 ***   71.62 ***   393.67 ***   302.88 ***   195.98 *** 
R-squared   0.17   0.21   0.19   0.15   0.17   0.13 
Number of firms   597   597   586   597   597   586 
Number of observations   4850   4850   4545   4850   4850   4545 
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Table 3. Stochastic frontier model 
 
 [1] [2] [3] 
Frontier equation    
    
(Log) Tobin's q   0.11 ***   0.11 ***   0.06 *** 
   (0.02)   (0.01)   (0.01) 
(Log) Sales(t)/Capital(t-1)   0.77 ***   0.81 ***   0.93 *** 
   (0.03)   (0.02)   (0.02) 
(Log) Sales(t-1)/Capital(t-2) - 0.10 **   0.34 ***   0.38 *** 
   (0.04)   (0.03)   (0.03) 
Constant - 2.04 *** - 2.49 *** - 2.50 *** 
   (0.18)   (0.02)   (0.02) 
    
Inefficiency equation    
    
Cash flow(t)/Capital(t-1)  - 0.27 *** - 0.10 *** 
    (0.06)   (0.03) 
(Log) Assets  - 0.07 ** - 0.07 ** 
    (0.04)   (0.03) 
High debt-to-equity ratio     0.21 * 
     (0.13) 
Business group membership   - 0.62 ** 
     (0.30) 
Time trend × Business group 
membership     0.07 *** 
     (0.03) 
Constant  . 0.80 ***   0.58 *** 
    (0.18)   (0.18) 
    
    
Number of firms   597   597   586 
Number of observations   4850   4850   4545 
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Figure 1. Impact of firm characteristics on financial constraint 
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Table 4. Summary statistics for distribution of investment efficiency 
 
 1997 2006 
Mean 
(Std. dev.) 
Median Mean 
(Std. dev.) 
Median 
Firm size 
 
Smaller 
 
Larger 
 
 
0.54 
(0.14) 
0.62 
(0.11) 
 
 
0.54 
 
0.64 
 
 
0.50 
(0.20) 
0.53 
(0.15) 
 
 
0.56 
 
0.55 
Business group 
affiliation 
 
Affiliated 
 
Unaffiliated 
 
 
0.55 
(0.14) 
0.59 
(0.12) 
 
 
0.55 
 
0.59 
 
 
0.48 
(0.20) 
0.52 
(0.17) 
 
 
0.49 
 
0.56 
Indebtedness 
 
High 
 
Not high 
 
 
0.55 
(0.13) 
0.58 
(0.13) 
 
 
0.55 
 
0.60 
 
 
0.48 
(0.19) 
0.51 
(0.17) 
 
 
0.52 
 
0.55 
Note: Values within parentheses are standard deviations. 
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Table 4. Marginal effects of Z variables 
 
 (Z) variables explaining 
inefficiency 
Cash flow (Log) assets 
10
th
 percentile -0.0032 -0.2104 
25
th
 percentile -0.0027 -0.1771 
50
th
 percentile -0.0022 -0.1488 
75
th
 percentile -0.0018 -0.1243 
90
th
 percentile -0.0016 -0.1062 
 
 
